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Although the  acquisition  and transfer  of  nuclear  weapons and weapons of  mass-destruction,  in
general, has been clearly forbidden by specific treaties, the fight against the indirect acquisition of
these weapons lies on a diversity of norms, which are often difficult to interpret.
According to the words of the Article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT, 1968), which is the main
international  legal  norm 1  dealing with the spread of  nuclear weapons,  “each nuclear weapon
State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or
other  nuclear  explosive  devices  or  control  over  such  weapons  or  explosive  devices  directly,  or
indirectly;  and not in any way to assist,  encourage, or  induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control
over such weapons or explosive devices”. One may pragmatically notice, at this stage, that not only
the  nuclear-weapon  States 2  are  able  to  contribute  to  the  proliferation  of  these  weapons.
Non-nuclear-weapon  States  may  also,  depending  on  their  respective  technological  advances.
Therefore, Article II of the NPT embraces this possibility and “locks” a maximum of scenarios, stating
that “each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from
any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over
such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in
the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.
If the direct transfers of nuclear weapons are clearly forbidden by these two articles of the Treaty, the
challenge thus remains to define the potential  situations embraced by their  “indirect”  transfer or
acquisition. A first element of answer is brought by Article III.2 of the NPT, stating that “each State
Party  to  the Treaty  undertakes not  to  provide:  (a)  source or  special  fissionable  material,  or  (b)
equipment  or  material  especially  designed or  prepared for  the processing,  use or  production of
special  fissionable material,  to  any non-nuclear-weapon State for  peaceful  purposes,  unless the
source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article”.
A few observations shall be made, at this stage of the reflection. First, this provision concerns all the
parties to the Treaty, notwithstanding their status of nuclear (NWS) or non-nuclear weapon States
(NNWS). Its vocation is thus universal, in the limits of the universality of the Treaty itself. Then, it
deals with sources, materials and equipments that may be considered as direct components of a
nuclear  weapon.  The  “indirect”  transfer  of  acquisition  of  these  weapons  encompasses,  rather
logically, its constitutive and necessary components. However, if a central term for the description of
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these components is “especially designed” for a use in nuclear weapons, the question remains for
the  elements  –  which  does  not  apply  to  materials  because  they  may,  by  definition,  “fuel”  both
peaceful  and  non-peaceful  activities  –  that  are  not  primarily  designed for  the  construction  of  a
weapon, that have both peaceful and non-peaceful applications, and which are commonly referred
as “dual-use” items. The last observation that shall be made is that the transfers - referred to as
“provisions” - of these materials and equipments are not banned by Article III.2. They are only limited
by the condition that such items remain under applicable safeguards despite their transfer to another
entity.  This  article  of  the  NPT  is  important  because  it  submits  the  trade  to  controls,  aimed  at
preventing the spread of the weapon. However it allows the emergence of a nuclear trade, which is a
sine qua non condition of the “democratization” of the benefits of peaceful nuclear applications. As a
general  requirement,  indeed,  the  application  of  these  controls  shall  “(…)  avoid  hampering  the
economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of
peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment
for  the processing,  use or  production of  nuclear material  for  peaceful  purposes  (…)”,  under the
words of Article III.4.
If the NPT, despite the threat represented by the direct components of a nuclear weapon, allows
their trade, does that mean that the dual-use items are a less important threat for the proliferation of
nuclear weapon and that their trade shall not be constrained? Obviously, the threat represented by
the transfer of dual-use items is measured by the intended end-use of these items. Therefore, their
trade cannot be defined, neither as a threat nor safe, a priori. The NPT itself does not address this
dilemma. However,  other international  legally  binding norms have confirmed the feeling that  the
trade of such politically sensitive items represents a potential threat to global security.
“If for common goods and services, such as textiles, air transports, telecommunications, lifting trade
barriers  appeared  necessary  in  order  to  establish  an  international  trading  system,  it  was  also
acknowledged that other goods and services, notably weapons and dual-use items, could not be
considered as ordinary goods and for political reasons had to be submitted to or maintained under
the national restrictive measures” 3 . Therefore, an exception has been introduced in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Round (GATT) adopted in 1948, allowing participating States to
maintain  or  adopt  national  restrictive  measures  with  respect  to  certain  items  or  transactions  if
motivated by the protection of their “essential security interests”:
- Specifically in the nuclear area if “relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they
are derived”;
- Less specifically if “relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such
traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying
a military establishment”;
-  And  generally,  “to  prevent  any  contracting  party  from  taking  any  action  in  pursuance  of  its
obligations  under  the  United  Nations  Charter  for  the  maintenance  of  international  peace  and
security”.
The Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (EU), implementing indirectly Article XXI, has
included  a  similar  exception  allowing  Member  States  to  restraint  trade  exchanges  between
themselves  (Article  36)  and toward  third  States  (Article  346).  The European Union is,  to  some
extent, an intermediary level between the international and the national ones. Historically, its primary
raison  d’être  was  economical  and  the  trade  policy  is  its  exclusive  competence.  However,  it
progressively demonstrated along its construction process its intention to become a true player of
worldwide security and now shares some competences in this field with its 27 Member States, which
still hold their sovereignty as the source of the Union’s influence on the international stage.
Pressed by both their international and European commitments, do the EU Member States still have
a room for manoeuvre for the regulation of their nuclear dual-use items’ trade? Formulated in an
other way,  how the Member State can legally  conciliate their  national  economic interests in the
worldwide competition with the necessities of a global security?
This reflection will approach this head question through three different stages, corresponding to the
three sections of this paper, keeping in mind the picture of Russian dolls, which, hopefully, fit one in
the other. This will also be an opportunity for playing with the, rather extensively discussed, concepts
of  “soft  law”  and  “hard  law”  and  see  where  the  export  control  of  nuclear  dual-use  goods  and
technologies may fit in the debate.
The first section will consist in describing the guidelines in this area, provided at the international
level, and analysing the forces that are playing inside its borders for - and also against - a greater
role of the Union on the international stage. The second one will consist in presenting the concrete
Cahier n°26 - International and European commitments to the ex... http://popups.ulg.ac.be/csp/document.php?id=707&format=print
2 sur 17 29/01/13 17:02
implementation of  these commitments and analysing the mutation of  the legal  strength of  these
provisions with regard to distinction soft-hard law. The third and final one will consist in going through
and analysing the room for manoeuvre left to the EU Member States, notably through an illustration
by the French export control system, for conciliating security with economical interests.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF THE NUCLEAR DUAL-USE ITEMS TRADE:
“SOFT LAW”
I.1 THE INTERNATIONAL AMBITIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE AREA:
The European Union is a complex actor in the international society. It is not a State, even though it
has its own legal  personality since the Lisbon Treaty (Article 47 of  the Treaty on the European
Union), its own borders and citizenship. It is not a classical international organisation either, since its
object is general and encompass all the activities normally dealt with at the level of the States. It is
active in economical, social, environmental, justice and foreign affairs, notably, and has the power to
constrain  its  Member States in  some of  these areas through legal  acts  that  prevail  on national
legislations. The progressive integration of the policies is pursued in different ways, according to the
“sovereign” character of the policies. Since its legitimacy for acting in a certain area is conferred by
its Member States, through the fundamental treaties, the Union’s ray of action in classical States’
privileges is more limited. In foreign affairs, including security and defence-related issues, the Union
as a body sees its room for manoeuvre constrained by the will of the Member States themselves and
the decision-making processes are classically intergovernmental. However, it shall not be made a
rule out of this “sovereignty” criteria. Although justice and internal affairs are classical sovereign
responsibilities  of  the  States,  in  the  international  society,  these  areas  have  been  progressively
“occupied” by the Union and became integrated with the Lisbon Treaty which entered into force in
January 2010. The currency also became integrated, since 2020, although classically seen as a
sovereign area of the State.
The European Union may be characterised, therefore, as a sui generis international organisation in
which integration progresses,  even in  the area of  foreign and security  policy  while  a  European
External Action Service is expected to represent the Union at the international level, but ceases
ground to intergovernmentalism in specific areas such as those related to the security of the Union
and its Member States.
The  non-proliferation  of  weapons  of  mass-destruction  and  subsequently  the  spread  of  nuclear
weapons is, logically, a component of the perception by the European Union of the threats to its
security.  Even  though  security  and  defence  are  primarily  the  sovereign  responsibilities  of  the
Member States of the Union, as stated above, it  is interesting to look at the strategic provisions
adopted at the European level in order to get a clear picture of the international commitment of the
Union to the non-proliferation of the WMD.
In 2003, the EU, composed by 15 Member States but having already in mind its enlargement to 10
former Warsaw Pact and 2 Mediterranean countries, made an attempt to define and write down the
strategic threats it considered as crucial for its security, as a sign of its consensus and a strong
signal of its cohesion to be sent to the rest of the world. Even though oppositions existed among the
Member States and acceding States about the bien fondé of the participation to the invasion of Iraq
at this precise time, they managed to get over their differences and agreed, certainly at the most
difficult  time,  on a  certain  number  of  threats  and their  definitions  at  the  Thessaloniki  European
Council meeting in June 2003. The European Security Strategy (ESS), entitled “A secure Europe in
a better world” 4  as a signal of their ambition to take an active part in the pursuit of the global
security, was finally adopted as a common strategy by the heads of States and Governments in
December 2003. The document is not legally binding itself since it is a strategy and that it has been
drafted by the Institute for Security Studies of the EU 5 , the scientific body of the EU on areas
related to security and defence, but the context of its adoption and its scientific origin make it a
reliable  base  for  investigating  the  perception  of  threats  by  the  Union  and,  subsequently,  its
commitment to solving the issue of the proliferation of WMD.
The provisions of the ESS are rather generic, which may be considered as a weakness for the
message it aims at spreading to the world but which is usual for a description of threats at a strategic
level. The proliferation of WMDs is the second threat 6  in the list and it is interesting to read that
the EU considers it, through this document, as being “potentially the greatest threat to (its) security”.
Furthermore,  it  stressed  the  fact  that  “the  international  treaty  regimes  and  export  control
arrangements  have  slowed  the  spread  of  WMD  and  delivery  systems” 7 .  Within  the  ESS,
therefore, the European Union affirms its commitment as a coherent entity of and in the international
society to cope with the proliferation of these weapons at a worldwide level and emphasizes the
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adequacy and needs for international coordination as the solution.
The Union even went further on this issue than the single and rather generic approach of the ESS.
The same day the latter one has been finalised, the European Council  also endorsed a specific
strategy named “EU Strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass-Destruction” 8 . It must be
noted, at this stage, that it was at this time the only threat, among the five identified by the ESS, for
which a specific strategy has been designed and adopted. In this document, the EU develops its
vision on this specific challenge and the means for handling it. To this respect, it stresses three key
ideas along its text:
- The Union seeks universalisation of the treaties and the provision agreed on by the regimes;
-  Actions  may  be  undertaken  by  the  Member  States  or  the  Union  but  always  in  a  multilateral
framework;
- The action must be comprehensive and promote stable international and regional environments.
The Strategy also goes more into details regarding the indirect threat posed by the trade of items
which might be used for a non-peaceful purpose. The objectives of the Union are: “strengthening
export control policies and practices in co-ordination with partners of the export control regimes;
advocating, where applicable, adherence to effective export control criteria by countries outside the
existing regimes and arrangements; strengthening suppliers regimes and European co-ordination in
this area” 9 . Concretely, these objectives are to be pursued in 10 :
- Making the EU a leading co-operative player in the export control regimes by co-ordinating EU
positions within the different regimes, supporting the membership of acceding countries and where
appropriate involvement of the Commission, promoting a catch-all clause in the regimes, where it is
not already agreed, as well as strengthening the information exchange, in particular with respect to
sensitive destinations, sensitive end-users and procurement patterns;
- Reinforcing the efficiency of export control in an enlarged Europe, and successfully conducting a
Peer  Review to  disseminate  good practices  by  taking  special  account  of  the  challenges  of  the
forthcoming enlargement;
- Setting up a programme of assistance to States in need of technical knowledge in the field of
export control;
- Working to ensure that the Nuclear Suppliers Group make the export of controlled nuclear and
nuclear  related  items  and  technology  conditional  on  ratifying  and  implementing  the  Additional
Protocol;
- Promoting in the regimes reinforced export controls with respect to intangible transfers of dual-use
technology, as well as effective measures relating to brokering and transhipment issues;
- Enhancing information exchange between Member States. Considering exchange of information
between the EU SitCen 11  and like-minded countries.
The international political commitment of the European Union for the fight against the proliferation of
WMDs through the control of the trade of material and dual-use items may thus be characterized as
public and strong. However, one may wonder if these intents are followed at the sub-European level,
meaning the Member States’, as they are the roots of the legitimacy of the Union’s actions in the
field  of  international  security.  Is  the  European  Union  a  coherent  actor  in  these  international
instruments established for the fight against proliferation?
First of all, it must be said that the legal status of the EU vis-à-vis the international community is a
limitation for its ambition as stated in its strategies. As it is not a State, it is not entitled to become of
full party to the NPT. In the same way, the EU is not a member of the United-Nations either and,
even though the EU has already set provisions for the export control of dual-use items and may be
thus considered in compliance with its Paragraph 3, is not comprised at first sight in the scope of
application of UN Security Council  Resolution 1540(2004) which applies to States only.  It  is not
represented as such in the Security Council Committee for the implementation of the Resolution
1540 12  (“1540 Committee”) but it undertook to organise technical assistance outreach activities,
complementarily to the activities of the Committee. Since 2005, the European Commission has given
mandate to the German licensing authority (BAFA) for organising this assistance in the building and
implementation of dual-use goods export control systems 13 .
All EU Member States have ratified or acceded the NPT 14 . Only Spain, in 1987, and France, in
1992, have acceded the NPT after their entry into the Union, notwithstanding the Member States of
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the Union which ratified the Treaty at the time of its conclusion. Furthermore, bearing in mind the
particularities  of  France and the United-Kingdom being nuclear  weapon States 15 ,  all  the EU
Member States have placed their nuclear material and activities under the safeguards established by
an Additional Protocol of INFCIRC/540 type 16 . Regarding non-proliferation and non-diversion of
its material, the European Union presents then a certain unity, which is reinforced by a regime of
common ownership of the nuclear sources under the hat of Euratom 17 .  Regarding the export
control, and more specifically the export control of dual-use items which may be integrated in the
manufacturing of a nuclear weapon, the Union also sets this unity as a principle. All Member States,
indeed,  participate  to  the  Nuclear  Supplier  Group  (NSG) 18 ,  the  forum  where  the  46  main
international  producers  and  exporters  of  nuclear  dual-use  items  meet,  and  the  European
Commission participates as an observer. If this demonstrates the unity and weight of the Union, the
latter has no right of vote. This over-representation of the EU with 28 seats may be in position to
create confusion. In 2008, indeed, when the issue of the Indian exception to the application of the
guidelines of the NSG came to the suppliers’ plenary meeting, two EU Member States, Austrian and
Ireland showed remarkable reluctance for adopting the exception that was proposed. As such, the
European Union and, seating at the table, the European Commission, were not able to define a
common line and to speak from one voice 19 . The representation of each State individually may
be seen therefore as a source of confusion but cases like the Indian exception are in position to
perpetuate this over-representation as none of the Member States would be willing to see its own
position not taken into account in the debate.
Regarding  the  means  of  delivery  of  the  weapons,  which  are  completely  integrated  into  the
non-proliferation  challenge,  it  must  be  noted  that  “only”  19  EU  Member  States,  out  of  34
participants 20  are represented at the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 21 . The EU,
therefore, has the keys for weighing on the decisions adopted by these regimes, but only through its
Member States.
I.2 THE INTERNATIONAL PROVISIONS IN THE NUCLEAR DUAL-USE ITEMS EXPORT
CONTROL
The Nuclear Supplier Group was set up in 1992, as a continuation of the London Club founded in
1985. Its creation has been motivated by the refusal of France to join the NPT at the date of its
conclusion  and  its  subsequent  refusal  to  take  part  to  the  Zangger  Committee,  which  aimed at
developing lists of  items suggested by the words of  Article III.2 of  the NPT. However,  the NSG
quickly  imposed itself  not  only  as  a  duplication  of  the  Committee  in  an  other  configuration  but
brought an added value to the fight against the proliferation of nuclear weapons in setting for the first
time specific guidelines for the export of nuclear dual-use items. In the framework of this reflection,
no specific analysis of the “Trigger List” - i.e.  nuclear material which “triggers” the application of
safeguards  according  to  the  NPT -  will  be  made  and  the  focus  will  be  on  the  dual-use  items
provisions.
The NSG members agreed on the fundamental principle that their exports of listed nuclear dual-use
items shall be submitted to authorisation, in accordance with their national legislation.
The list on which they agreed and which is attached in annex of the guidelines is divided into six
sections:  “industrial  equipment”,  “materials”,  “uranium  isotope  separation  equipment  and
components”, “heavy water production plant related equipment”, “test and measurement equipment
for the development of nuclear explosive devices” and “components for nuclear explosive devices”.
Concretely, the decision of the national authorities to grant or deny the export authorisation shall be
based on a certain number of conditions, which are objectives requirements that can be verified, and
criteria, which are subjective requirements left at the appreciation of the authorities.
As of conditions, the national authorities receiving an application for an export authorisation shall
request the following information 22 :
- A statement from the end-user specifying the uses and end-use location of the proposed transfer;
- An assurance explicitly stating that the proposed transfer or any replica thereof will not be used in
any nuclear explosive activity or unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity.
- An assurance that the prior consent of the export will  be asked before any re-export to a third
country of the item transferred;
As of criteria, the national authorities receiving an application for an export authorisation shall decide
according to the following considerations 23 :
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- Whether the recipient state is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or to the Treaty
for  the  Prohibition  of  Nuclear  Weapons  in  Latin  America  (Treaty  of  Tlatelolco),  or  to  a  similar
international  legally-binding  nuclear  non-proliferation  agreement,  and  has  an  IAEA  safeguards
agreement in force applicable to all its peaceful nuclear activities (“full-scope safeguards”);
-  Whether  any  recipient  state  that  is  not  party  to  the  NPT,  Treaty  of  Tlatelolco,  or  a  similar
international  legally-binding nuclear  non-proliferation agreement  has any facilities  or  installations
listed above that are operational or being designed or constructed that are not, or will not be, subject
to IAEA safeguards;
- Whether the equipment, materials, software, or related technology to be transferred is appropriate
for the stated end-use and whether that stated end-use is appropriate for the end- user;
- Whether the equipment, materials, software, or related technology to be transferred is to be used in
research on or development, design, manufacture, construction, operation, or maintenance of any
reprocessing or enrichment facility;
- Whether governmental actions, statements, and policies of the recipient state are supportive of
nuclear  non-proliferation  and  whether  the  recipient  state  is  in  compliance  with  its  international
obligations in the field of non-proliferation;
- Whether the recipients have been engaged in clandestine or illegal procurement activities; and
- Whether a transfer has not been authorized to the end-user or whether the end-user has diverted
for purposes inconsistent with the Guidelines any transfer previously authorized.
- Whether there is reason to believe that there is a risk of diversion to acts of nuclear terrorism.
-  Whether  there  is  a  risk  of  retransfers  of  equipment,  material,  software,  or  related  technology
identified in the list or of transfers of any replica thereof contrary to the principle of non-diversion of
the items from their peaceful intents, as a result of a failure by the recipient State to develop and
maintain appropriate, effective national export and transhipment controls, as identified by United-
Nations Security Council Resolution 1540.
Additionally,  the  NSG agreed on an other  important  provision for  the  comprehensiveness of  its
approach, aimed at broadening the spectrum of the control over proliferation risks. The participating
States are required to implement according to their domestic legislation a mechanism that “ensures
that their national legislation requires an authorisation for the transfer of items not listed if the items
in question are or may be intended, in their entirety or in part, for use in connection with a “nuclear
explosive activity” 24 . The participating States are encouraged to share information on the denials
issued on the basis of such “catch-all” clause.
The NSG is not an international organisation but a forum of “good wills”, sharing best practices and a
common understanding of the requirements that shall be imposed on the trade of these sensitive
items in order to avoid proliferation. To this regard, the legal strength of the provisions agreed on do
not come from the NSG itself but from the implementation that is undertaken by the participating
States of these provisions. No legal sanction is attached to the outcomes of these meetings but, on
the political level, the participating States may cease their cooperation with one of their partners
which undercut the realisation of the objectives of the NSG, for example in granting an authorisation
for an export similar to an application denied in an other NSG State. To this end, the NSG decisions
may be seen as confidence-building measures for a sound competition between the main producers
of nuclear items and, behind them, their industries.
The NSG is not an international export control regime, either. Indeed, it does not meet the three
cumulative characteristics of such regime, which are: an authorisation requirement for the trade of
these items, a control and verification regime of the non-diversion, and a system of sanctions for the
infringement of the rules. In the case of the NSG provisions, they apply only to the States, which
voluntarily  participate,  and  the  control  and  verification  remain,  at  the  international  level,  the
responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, hereunder also referred to as “the
Agency”), which is also the only authority able to characterize the infringement triggering potential
sanctions. Despite the fact that the NSG communicates the provisions it agreed on to the Agency in
order to publish them and ensure predictability for potential recipient States 25 , the provisions do
not produce legal effect for third parties. The only possibility for direct sanctions by NSG participating
States is the immediate termination of the trade connections. Therefore, it shall be stated, from the
analysis  of  these  guidelines,  that  the  international  guidelines  for  the  export  control  of  nuclear
dual-use  items  have  the  characteristics  of  soft  law  for  the  States  to  which  they  apply  and,  in
particular as will be developed in the next section, for the EU, leaving it with a rather important room
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for manoeuvre in establishing an export control regime.
II. THE EUROPEAN UNION BY AND FOR ITSELF: “HARDER LAW”
If the guidelines agreed at the NSG level may be characterized as soft law, due to the political rather
than legal sanctions attached to the respect of the provisions of INFCIRC/254/Part2, the European
provisions for the control  of  the nuclear dual-use items’ trade are undoubtedly “harder” in many
respects.
II.1 FORMALLY, “HARDER LAW”
The European regulations, which are the instruments used in this area for legislating, are directly
applicable to and in the Member States. It means that, unlike the international “legislation”, such as
the treaties, no further enactment in the national legal order is necessary in principle. Article 288 of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) states that these acts constrain the
European institutions, the Member States as well as the entities they address to, meaning individual
and private entities, as soon as their entry into force takes place. Furthermore, the EU regulations
are directly enforceable. It means that the national courts are required to rule the cases which they
may know of according to the applicable European legislation contained in the regulations and that
their appreciation of the law maybe challenged before the European Court of Justice if a party so
requires. The capacity of the Court to decide about cases standing before it in the field of nuclear
dual-use items’ export control is very symbolic of the overall organisation of the European Union and
the dilemma of the area itself since the Court is enable to judge on the basis of regulations, which
legislate on Community matters (former first pillar of the European Union), but not on the basis of
acts taken in the EU foreign security affairs, the second pillar. For the same topic, the competence of
the  Court  of  Justice  will  be  determined  by  the  consideration  whether  the  case  touches  on
international security aspects or on trade aspects. However, as introduced in the first section, the
European  provisions  on  nuclear  dual-use  items’  export  control  issued  under  the  foreign  affairs
umbrella  are  rather  generic  and,  therefore,  limit  the  risks  of  contradiction  with  “Community”
provisions.
Even though the regulations are in principle directly applicable and enforceable, which distinguishes
them from the European directives, further executive acts may be taken by the Member States if
necessary. Indeed, according to their obligation of sincere cooperation and under the words of Article
4 of  the Treaty on the European Union (TEU),  “The Member States shall  take any appropriate
measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or
resulting  from the  acts  of  the  institutions  of  the  Union”.  The fact  that  the  European Union has
adopted regulations in the area of the nuclear dual-use items’ export control, therefore, does not
impede the Member States to have individual room for manoeuvre even though it formally restrains it
in principle.
The European Union’s system lies on two main acts: the Council Regulation 428/2009 of 5 May
2009 26  and the Council Joint Action of 22 June 2000 27 . Since the latter one has a specific
approach focused on technical assistance for certain military end-uses and that it has been agreed
in the Common Foreign and Security Policy framework, this reflection will not particularly develop
this aspect. The Council Regulation 428/2009 is not the first regulation touching on the export control
of  dual-use  items  in  general.  The  first  one  was  adopted  already  in  1994 28  by  the  Council.
However, the Commission claimed at this time that the control of the export of dual-use items was
primarily the area of the common trade policy and not of security exclusively 29 . The European
Court of Justice comforted the Commission in its opinion and invalidated the Council Regulation.
However, the Commission investigated in details the state of the art of the export control systems in
the Member States in 1997 and concluded that the coexistence of the different national regimes
undermined  the  application  of  custom  controls 30 .  Therefore,  it  started  preparing  a  set  of
measures aimed at coordinating the Member States export control regimes, i.e. in harmonizing the
different legislation, without standardising them, however. The Council Regulation 1334/2000 setting
up  a  Community  regime  for  the  control  of  export  of  dual-use  items  and  technology 31  was
therefore drafted and released as the first attempt to harmonize the national provisions. Despite its
title, the Regulation was generic, meaning that it did not only limit itself to the definition of dual-use
items and technology but included also the material contained for example in the trigger lists of the
Zangger Committee and the NSG, to mention only the nuclear area. The approach of the Regulation
was thus already generic in 2000. In 2009, this approach went from “generic” to “comprehensive”.
The Council Regulation 428/2009, repealing Regulation 1334/2000, intends to set up a Community
regime not only for the export of dual-use items and technology, but extends it to their brokering and
transit as well. Nuclear dual-use items are thus only a small proportion of the scope of application.
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The term of “regime” demonstrates the importance the EU attaches to this harmonisation. However,
it may be improperly used in the meaning that the verification of its implementation and the possible
sanctions to the infringements do not lie in the hands of the Union itself.  Indeed, the European
Regulation  does  not  establish  any  system  of  sanction.  According  to  Article  24  of  Regulation
428/2209, “each Member State shall take appropriate measures to ensure proper enforcement of all
the  provisions  of  this  Regulation.  In  particular,  it  shall  lay  down  the  penalties  applicable  to
infringements of the provisions of this Regulation or of those adopted for its implementation. Those
penalties must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive”. This article is important, at this stage of
the reflection because it clearly stresses two ideas:
- The Regulation leaves the Member States with the responsibility of the control and verification of
these harmonising measures;
-  The Regulation is one of these regulations which need further implementation by the Member
States.
As a consequence, the provisions of Regulation 428/2009 do not exactly fit the idea of a European
export  control  regime,  but  shall  rather  be seen as  essential  components  of  a  European export
control system.
Formally, the European provisions related to the nuclear dual-use items’ export control do not reach
the characteristics of “hard law”, even though they are undoubtedly harder than the international
provisions set by the guidelines.
II.2 SUBSTANTIALLY, “HARDER LAW”
In their content, the provisions of Regulation 428/2009 have a level of detail  that is close to the
concept of “hard law”.
As regards the basic principles that drive the European export control system, a parallel must be
drawn with the international guidelines that were presented in the first section. The intent of the
European Union in this area, and in the nuclear dual-use especially, is to implement the provisions
agreed on at the multilateral level. Nevertheless, the EU brings into the area its own specificity and
vision  about  the  challenges  derived  from  the  non-proliferation  of  WMD.  The  principle  of  the
requirement of an authorisation for dual-use items remain the key concept. Unlike the military items
for which the principle is the ban on the export and the exception is the authorisation 32 , the export
of dual-use items are authorised in principle and the ban is the exception. This requirement, like it
has been described with the NSG guidelines, is connected with the publication of lists of items.
However, in the Regulation 428/2009 - and before that within Regulation 1334/2000 - the European
list  is  an effort  of  comprehensive compilation of  all  the lists  adopted by the international  export
control  fora:  Wassenaar  Arrangement  (arms),  MTCR (ballistic),  NSG (nuclear),  Australia  Group
(biological) and Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC, chemical). It must be reminded, at this stage,
that some of these lists - owing to the fact that some of the Member States do not participate to all
these  fora 33  -  found  thus  a  way  to  apply  to  originally-third  States.  Despite  the  title  of  the
Regulation, as it has been briefly introduced earlier, not only the dual-use items lists are integrated
into the European list, but also, in the case of the nuclear items, the “trigger lists” 34 . For these
reasons, the European list that provokes the requirement of an authorisation for export is structured
in 10 categories, instead of 6 only for the NSG. The list is the Annex I - an integral part therefore - of
the European Regulation and, since it is detailed and shall be considered exhaustive, it binds the
Member States, which have no room for interpretation: either the considered item is in the list and a
licence shall be applied for, either it is not and the principle is that no authorisation is required. In the
course of the current reflection, the European inclusion of the international lists is fundamental. The
EU Member States are now bound by the lists although they were related only to guidelines, when
describing them at the international level. These lists, through the EU intermediary, became hard law
for the Member States although they were only soft law, originally.
One of the main improvements of the Regulation 428/2009 compared to Regulation 1334/2000 has
been the extension of the scope of application of the controls to movements other than exports, as
suggested  by  their  respective  titles.  In  2000,  already,  the  European  Union  had  introduced  the
distinction  between  exports  (to  third-countries)  and  transfers  (intra-Community)  in  order  to
emphasize the importance of the internal area of trust and free trade for the Union. As mentioned
earlier the Union had also left in 2000 the idea of including the supply of service or transmission of
technology  which  would  involve  cross-border  movements  of  person  to  the  responsibility  of  the
Common Foreign and Security Policy,  as they must be seen as components of the cooperation
between the Union and third-States in the area of security and defence. These aspects, therefore,
are regulated by the Council Joint Action of June 2000. In 2009, the Union added also the external
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transit of goods and the brokering to this pre-existing ground. Therefore, it is going further beyond
the limited scope of the NSG guidelines.
In the Article 2 of Regulation 428/2009, the term “export” includes, apart from its common meaning,
also the re-export of the item or technology and, coming to this latter element, the intangible exports,
meaning  the  transmission  of  technology  or  software  through  electronic  media,  which  are  more
difficult to control in practice. The key principle, under Article 3, is that any export of item listed (in the
Annex I)  shall  be  subjected  to  authorisation,  similar  to  the  NSG provisions.  The exporter  must
therefore address his national authority for such authorisation granted in the form of a licence. In the
European Regulation, the “catch-all” concept may be also found but it has been developed:
- The EU Member States may impose an authorisation requirement for items not listed if there is a
risk that the item to be exported may be diverted to a WMD programme (Article 4.3, similar to the
NSG provisions);
- The exporter must notify its authorities if he is aware that his export of not-listed items is intended
to  serve  to  a  WMD  programme  (Article  4.4)  and  the  authorities  decide  whether  or  not  an
authorisation is required;
-  The Member  States  may impose an  authorisation  requirement  if  the  exporter  has  ground for
suspecting that his export of not-listed items may serve to a WMD programme (Article 4.5, also
called “suspicion clause”);
- The Member States may prohibit or impose an authorisation requirement for an export of not-listed
items if the export may be used in breach with public security or human rights considerations (Article
8.1).
The two latter clauses are only options for the Member States although the two former must be
implemented in the national legislations.
The possibility to impose an authorisation requirement or a ban on transit operations, i.e.  transit
through the Union’s territory of a good for a destination located in a third-EU country (Article 2), is the
sole responsibility of the Member States. However, only the transit of items listed in Annex I which
may contribute to a WMD programme and items not-listed for a military end-use or for an end-use
country under subjected to embargo may be submitted to authorisation requirement or ban. The
authorisation is only valid in the Member State where the item transits through, unlike the export
authorisation which is valid throughout the Union’ territory.
The brokering services, under the Regulation, include the selling, buying, negotiation or arrangement
of transaction from the European Union territory of a supply of dual-use items between two EU-third
countries (Article 2). The Member States may chose to impose an authorisation requirement for such
services, but not for the exercise of such activities. The requirement applies, notwithstanding the
“general requirement” position of the State, if the authorities inform the broker that an authorisation is
required for listed items or if the broker himself is aware that the listed items may be diverted to a
WMD programme (Article 5.1). However, catch-all clause for not-listed items may also apply if the
broker has ground for suspecting that the item for which it supplies services may contribute to a
WMD programme (“suspicion clause”, Article 5.3).
Regarding intra-community transfers, the requirements are more flexible, owing to the fact that the
Union is an area of trust, from a political point of view, and a free-trade area, from a legal point of
view.  Therefore,  the  binding  effect  of  Annex  I  does  not  take  place  for  these  transfers  and
authorisation are only required for some of the goods, listed in Annex IV. In addition, the Member
States may impose an authorisation requirement for transfers of goods not-listed in Annex IV only
under certain cumulative conditions set in Article 22 and if the Member State clearly informs the
Union and the other Member States that it requires such authorisation for a given category of goods.
A certain flexibility for the inner-trade, then, but the observation of the Annex IV shows that most of
the NSG items are covered by this authorisation requirement.
Unlike the NSG guidelines, the EU Regulation 428/2009, and before it Regulation 1334/2000, goes
more into details with regard to the shape the authorising licences may take in connection with the
spirit of harmonisation. It distinguishes four kinds of licences (Article 2) that may be used for all the
movements that are controlled, indistinctively (i.e. exports, transit and brokering):
- Individual export authorisations: granted to one specific exporter for one end user or consignee in a
third country for one or more dual-use items;
- Community General Export Authorisation (CGEA): for exports to certain countries of destination
listed in Annex available to all exporters who respects its conditions of use state in Annex II;
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- Global export authorisation: granted to one specific exporter in respect of a type or category of
dual-use items which may be valid for exports to one or more specified end users and/or in one or
more specified third countries 35 ;
-  National  general  export  authorisation:  granted  in  accordance  with  Article  9.4  and  defined  by
national legislation in conformity with Article 9 and Annex IIIc.
These authorisations must be valid, except for the transit as seen earlier, throughout the Union’s
territory. In annex of the Regulation, models of authorisation application forms are provided in order
to harmonise somehow the respective national procedures. It  must be noted, also, that only the
individual, global (Article 9.5) and CGEA authorisation must be implemented at the national level.
Regarding the conditions and criteria for authorising an export or an other kind of movement, the EU
Regulation goes less into details than the NSG guidelines, for example. The reason lies, very likely,
in the fact that the EU Regulation is, as stated earlier, generic and comprehensive. It does not make
the difference between the areas dealt with by the international export control fora. It would have
been certainly too confusing, from a practical point of view, to implement separately the conditions
and criteria these fora agreed on in the European Regulation. What makes sense as a condition for
the export of nuclear dual-use goods, such as the application of full-scope safeguards of the Agency,
does not make for biological products, for example. Conditions and criteria are thus a limitation to
the comprehensiveness of the EU Regulation and no mention to “European specific conditions” have
been made. Nevertheless, the EU Regulation, in its Article 12, refers to a series of generic criteria,
which shall be reviewed by the authorities for any dual-use export application:
- The obligations and commitments of the exporting Member State to international non-proliferation
regimes and export control regimes;
- Its obligations related to the sanctions decided by the Union, the OSCE or the UN Security Council;
- Its considerations on national foreign and security policy, including the application of European
provisions on the transfer of arms;
- Its consideration about the intended end use and the risk of diversion of its export.
Owing to the fact that the Union, within the Regulation, commits itself to the strict respect of the
guidelines issued by the thematic  international  fora,  it  may logically  be thought  that  the criteria
contained  in  the  Regulation  do  not  replace  the  internationally  agreed  criteria  but  have  to  be
considered additionally to these criteria. Dealing more specifically with nuclear dual-use items, there
is no obstacle, whatsoever, while all EU Member States participate to the NSG, thus making soft law
“harder” law in an indirect way. However, obstacles may perhaps exist in other area where not all the
EU Member States are represented, such as ballistic missiles’ items and technologies, for which
some of them might be left with no clear set of conditions and criteria. Differences in the conditions
and criteria may be, indeed, in position to challenge the sound competition the EU Regulation aims
at. Article 13 of the Regulation brings an embryo of solution to this potential issue: the EU Member
States, like in the NSG guidelines, are bound by a “no-undercut” principle. If a Member State intends
to grant an authorisation having similar characteristics to an authorisation already denied (including
on the basis of the application of a catch-all) in another Member State, these two must consult each
other.  The Member State in which the latest application is reviewed is not legally bound by the
opinion of the other State, However. The same consultation and freedom apply if a Member State
feels that its “essential  security interests” are threatened by an export  under review in an other
Member State (Article 11.2). The no-undercut principle is completed by a second one which requires
from a Member State examining a licence application for an item which is or will be located in an
other Member State to consult this State. Even though this requirement applies only to exports of
certain  categories of  items and/or  destinations (Article  11.1),  the opinion of  the consulted State
legally binds the State where the licence should be issued.
III. AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL: “HARD LAW”?
III.1 THE ORGANISATIONAL ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE OF THE FRENCH
LEGISLATION
Through this section, the reflection will refer to the example of the French “practice “of the nuclear
dual-use items’ export control. This area, indeed, is particularly important for France and the French
use of the guidelines and Regulation is particularly revealing of the challenges a European Union
member State might face in its implementation of these provisions. One limit of taking France as an
illustrative example is that it is a “big” Member State with a non-negligible power of influence on the
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European and international adoption of rules. Nevertheless, it is a fundamental mark of the EU that it
is composed of Member States sharing different views, influence and interests with regard to a given
issue. No “average” Member State may be taken as an example of a so-called “European” State. All
the 27 Member States are European and are integral part of the mosaic the Union is. In addition,
when  coming  to  the  nuclear  dual-use  items  challenges,  France  is  undoubtedly  an  excellent
illustration of the expectations a State can have with regard to the control of their international trade.
It may be said that France, for its size and weight in the international affairs, is a “heavy weight” actor
of the security businesses. It is the fourth world exporter of weapons and war-related equipments,
and is among the two first in the estimate per capita. Within the EU, it is the second exporter of such
goods, behind the United-Kingdom, and its exports in this area amount around 8 billion euros a year
(almost 3% of its total exports). When coming to the other “risky businesses”, France assumes a
similar status, notably thanks to industrial flagships such as the world leader in the nuclear area. The
well-known worldwide company employs 48,000 people and its annual sales, for 2009, amount 8,5
billion euros (60% of which is realised outside France) for all its activities, which extend on all the
nuclear cycle and the energy production 36 . It shall not be forgotten that if it is the world leading
company,  many other  French small  and medium-size companies are active on the international
nuclear  market.  The export  control  of  nuclear-dual  use  items,  therefore,  is  not  only  a  topic  for
concern for  France from an economical  point  of  view, but  involves also political,  diplomatic and
social fundamental dimensions for the country.
When coming to the export control, from a practical point of view, the weight of dual-use is also
considerable. In 2009, it amounted 20 billion euros 37  and, among the 2,500 to 3,000 licenses
granted  per  year,  17% are  issued  for  items  and  technologies  dealt  with  by  the  NSG.  Nuclear
dual-use items and technologies, therefore, are only a portion of the overall dual-use international
trade and the fact that the intra-Union trade does not always require authorisation must be kept in
mind.
France is also very committed, politically and legally, to the control of its export which may challenge
the non-proliferation of WMD. It is, since 1992, a party to the NPT, as a nuclear-weapon State, and a
participating State in  the Zangger  Committee and the NSG. In  the European framework,  it  has
demonstrated commitment to the efforts of  harmonisation and has implemented, since the 1994
“failed” attempt, all the regulations in the area. At the internal level, it must be mentioned also that
the first French dual-use export control legislation was issued as soon as 1944. France, therefore,
has a long-standing culture of the control of the exports of dual-use items, including nuclear ones.
The shape of the French legislation confirms this trend as, until 2010, legislation on weapons’ export
control and dual-use export control were modified and enacted in parallel. With the new round of
modifications in 2010, dual-use export control rules, contextually, seem to have progressively taken
their autonomy from a “sensitive trade” package. Substantially, the texts dealing with dual-use goods
are rather short and focus mainly on the organisation of procedures. Principles that drive the export
control are barely mentioned. In the French system, the implementing package is not legislative but
executive:
- Decree n° 292 of 18 March 2010, relating to the procedures of authorisation of export, transfer,
brokering and transit  of  dual-use goods and technologies and transferring competence from the
Direction of Customs to the Direction of Competitiveness, Industry and services 38 ;
-  Decree  n°  293  of  18  March  2010,  relating  to  the  Direction  of  Competitiveness,  Industry  and
services 39 ;
- Decree n° 294, creating an Inter-ministerial Commission of the Dual-Use Goods and Technologies
near the Minister of Foreign and European Affairs 40 ;
- Arrêté of 18 March 2010, creating of a national service named “Dual-Use Goods Service” 41 ;
- Arrêté of 18 March 2010, relating to the authorisation of export, import and transfer of dual-use
goods and technologies 42 ;
- And a Guide for the exporters 43  which, even though is not a legislative act because issued by
the French authority, provides advices directly to the exporters regarding their licences’ applications.
The practice 44  showed that  the authorisations issued by the French authority  rarely  concern
transit and brokering, are rarely based on catch-all clauses (less than 1% of the licences) and are
rarely issued under the form of a global authorisation. Therefore, in the course of this reflection on
the  possible  transformation  from European “harder  law”  to  national  hard  law,  one  may  wonder
whether France would use the European Regulation as a toolbox in which it can pick its necessary
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elements for its own legislation or if it would implement the whole regulatory package as its own
legislation.
In fact, as the titles of the French acts show, the French legislation has a merged approach, more
than generic and comprehensive, of the dual-use export control. It does not differentiate the nuclear
dual-use items from other dual-use items, in establishing separate legal acts for example. It does not
make a particular distinction between export, transit and brokering activities, either. It always refers
to “export” only, exception made of the direct mention of the European Regulation as a source of law.
However, a closer look at the substance of the French legislation, and in particular the Decree 45 ,
which  organises  the  procedure  for  the  issuance  of  authorisation,  leaves  no  doubt  about  the
application of  the procedures also to  transit  and brokering activities  in  its  Article  1:  “le  ministre
chargé de l'industrie fixe les modalités selon lesquelles il  statue sur les demandes d'autorisation
d'exportation prévues aux articles 3 et 4 et au paragraphe 2 de l'article 9 du règlement n° 428/2009
du Conseil du 5 mai 2009(…), sur les demandes d'autorisation de courtage prévues à l'article 5 et au
paragraphe 1 de l'article 10 de ce règlement, sur les demandes d'autorisation de transit prévues à
l'article  6  de  ce  règlement  ainsi  que  celles  présentées  en  application  de  l'article  8  du  même
règlement”.
In a general way, the French legislation fully endorses the principles contained in the Regulation, as
well  as the lists,  naturally.  As said in the previous section,  indeed, a European regulation is by
definition directly applicable to an in the Member States. Therefore, France cannot alter the content
of the Regulation 428/2009. In the Guide for the exporters, the Decree and the Arrêté constant and
regular references are made to the Regulation itself  and the application forms for a licence are
essentially  the  same as  the  model  provided  in  annex  to  the  Regulation.  In  the  context  of  our
reflection and the question that guides it, it is thus possible to answer that a Member State such as
France only has room for “organising”, in its most literal understanding, the authorisation procedures:
the Decree organises the role and involvement of the national public authorities in the procedure, the
Arrêté 46  organises the procedures to be followed by the industries and the authorities for issuing
a licence and the Guide provides direct information to the industries for being in line with all the
requirements. But, how much room does this “organisation” represent for a Member State?
France took the opportunity offered by Article 8 of Regulation 428/2009 to impose export controls on
helicopters  and their  spare  parts 47  and tear  gas  and riot  control  agents 48  for  destination
outside the EU. However, the possibility of these additional controls was foreseen and left free by the
Regulation itself. It does not concern any potential “factual occupation” of the French legislation over
the  field  already  ruled  by  the  Regulation.  The  Arrêté  organises  the  different  licences  and  the
procedures to be followed for their issuance. Individual and CGEA licences are harmonised at the
European  level,  as  described  earlier,  and  France  makes  only  little  recourse  to  global  licences.
However,  the  French  legislation  sets  5  national  general  export  authorisations  for  items  of  the
following categories:
- Chemical products;
- Some genetically-modified biological products;
- Graphite;
- Industrial items;
- Helicopters and their spare parts and tear gas and riot control agents (also called “licence 02”).
The first four, despite the fact that none of them focuses on nuclear dual-use items, are interesting in
the meaning that they correspond to lists of respective items and destinations established especially
for  this  purpose.  For  example,  the lists  of  authorised destinations for  a  national  general  export
authorisation include some of the French overseas departments and territories. Geographical and
administrative  specificities  of  a  Member  State  may  thus  be  reflected  in  the  dual-use  national
legislation.
Regarding the creation and organisation of national authorities, the European Regulation left the
responsibility  to  the  Member  States  for  setting  them according  to  their  internal  legislation  and
structures. In France, the authority was, before 2010, the Ministry in charge of the customs, assisted
by a service placed under its authority. In 2010 49 , the dual-use items and technology’s export
control has been placed under the authority of the Ministry responsible for the industry and a new
service, the Dual-Use Goods Service (SBDU under its French acronym) has been created under its
authority for dealing only with these specific items. The former service remains responsible for the
export control of non dual-use items such as weapons and an inter-ministerial commission 50  has
been created for arbitrating the possible conflicts of competences on items which might be difficult to
Cahier n°26 - International and European commitments to the ex... http://popups.ulg.ac.be/csp/document.php?id=707&format=print
12 sur 17 29/01/13 17:02
categorise as weapons or dual-use, for example.
Therefore, the practical implementation of the European provisions in the national legislation, from
an “organisational” point of view, does not leave room to this national legislation for stepping on the
substance of the export control of dual-use items and technologies, including nuclear ones. At least,
it  allows the Member States, notably in France where the source of the authority changed from
customs to industry  and where Guides for  the exporters were issued,  to  bring these provisions
“closer” to the industries.
The French national legislation not only “organises” the European provisions but also completes
them in filling some intentional gaps. Regulation 428/2009, indeed, does not deal with import control
and so leaves it to unilateral intents. It would have been counterproductive, indeed, for the European
“legislator” to provide rules in this area because the Regulation intends to counter proliferation in the
EU third countries only and that a Member State would remain free to chose to import not from an
EU third-country but from an other Member State, for which any application of import measure could
be considered as an equivalent measure to the restrain of the freedom of trade. In the international
context,  however,  the fact  that  a  European authority  is  entitled  to  issue an International  Import
Certificate  or  a  delivery  verification  certificate  may  be  seen  not  only  as  a  confidence-building
measure but may also be a requirement. Therefore, France adopted in its national legislation 51
procedures and forms for issuing these certificates.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the French national legislation makes European “harder law”
content  becoming  “hard  law”  in  attaching  sanctions  to  the  infringement  of  the  Regulation’s
provisions.  In  the  French  legislation,  which  substantially  makes  a  direct  connection  with  the
Regulation, the infringement of dual-use export control rules is sanctioned on two different levels.
The first one corresponds to a customs offence, for example for exporting without a licence, and the
Customs’ Code apply. The offender risks a three-year imprisonment, the seizure of the concerned
items, the transport means and the object that serve for hiding the offence and may be fined for an
amount from 1 up to 2 times the value of the fraud. However, if the offence becomes criminal, for
example if an intention for trafficking is proved, the infringement is sanctioned by the Criminal Code,
under the section “Fundamental interests of the Nation” and the exporter risks a 10 up to 30 months
imprisonment and a fine from 150 to 450,000 euros.
III.2 THE INCREASED RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR
The trend in the export control in general, which includes the nuclear dual-use items, it to make the
industries  more  responsible  of  the  export  policies  and,  therefore,  to  involve  them more  in  the
regulation of the sensitive items’ trade. Within the EU Regulation, this trend is witnessed in Article
12.2  in  which  it  is  stated  that  “when assessing  an application  for  a  global  export  authorisation
Member States shall  take into consideration the application by the exporter of proportionate and
adequate means and procedures to ensure compliance with the provisions and objectives of this
Regulation and with  the terms and conditions of  the authorisation”.  The Regulation thus clearly
applies to the sub-national, i.e. individual, level. Despite the fact that this requirement is intended for
the  context  of  global  export  authorisation  and  that  the  French  authority  only  rarely  issue  such
authorisations, as stated above, the French legislation 52  established 6 criteria to be followed for
an effective internal compliance programme (ICP) and to be verified by the SBDU:
- The internal verification of the nature of the dual-use goods to be exported with regard to the
destination;
-  The implementation and follow-up of a list  of  internal  personnel responsible for monitoring the
respect by the export of the principles of the dual-use export control;
- The implementation of an internal audit programme for checking the respect of the procedures;
- The implementation of a procedure aiming at detecting the customer companies which are prone to
infringing the dual-use goods export control;
- The implementation of a training programme for the personnel dealing with the treatment of the
orders subjected to global export licence;
-  The implementation of  a  specific  system of  archives of  the reports  of  the operations and the
documentary follow-up of the orders in order to allow the administration obtaining the information
about past exchanged if it so desires.
This  tendency  to  increase  the  involvement  of  the  private  sector,  and  collaterally  increase  its
responsibility, in the regulation of the dual-use items and technology’s trade accurately reveals and
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translate into the legal debate the philosophical opposition between security and competitiveness.
As presented in the previous section, the EU Regulation aims at harmonizing the national export
control rules in order to avoid the possible distortion of competition between a Member State with
strict rules “locking” the possibility of spread of WMDs and a Member State being more liberal for the
benefit of its own companies. However, in the international society, this distortion may remain and
the private sector in the European Union legitimately claims for an increased freedom. However,
international security may lose where international competitiveness wins.
The ICPs may be a start of solution in making the private sector more self-responsible of its impact
on  the  international  security.  The  claim  that  the  private  sector  makes,  generally,  is  that  the
authorisation procedures take time although the reality of the business is dependant on this time: the
longer  it  takes  to  obtain  the  authorisation,  the  less  business  perspectives  last.  Therefore,  in
assessing the respect  of  the conditions and criteria  for  a  dual-use items’  export  already at  the
source, i.e. within the company, the national authorities are normally expected to issue the licence
faster. To this regard, the organisational responsibility of the Member State, always in accordance to
the EU Regulation, is fundamental. The Member States, in general, may be expected to use their
room for manoeuvre, even though limited, for  improving the competitiveness at  the sub-national
level. As regards the French business reality, in particular and beyond the fact that global export
authorisations are rarely issued, the generalisation of the ICP “spirit” may meet one obstacle that will
be a major challenge for the newly-established authority: the French dual-use industrial structure is
not  only  formed by big  companies but  also,  and mainly  if  estimated in  numbers,  by  small  and
medium size companies. These companies, which often focuses on the production of one flagship
product, have for many of them not reached the critical size for dedicating money and personnel for
the implementation of these internal measures and may simply, for some of them, be unaware of the
risks of their production and exports for the international security. These challenges are taken very
seriously by France and the SBDU as received the assignment of spreading the information and the
best practices for the dual-use items in general.
More specifically in the nuclear area, France established in April 2008 its Nuclear Policy Council
(CPN under its French acronym) 53 . The CPN, presided by the President of the Republic, “defines
the main orientations of the nuclear policy and monitor their implementation notably with regard to
export and international cooperation (and) industrial policy” 54 . As it may hear representatives of
the French nuclear industry, it may legitimately be expected that it will be, sooner or later, addressed
with the challenge of balancing competitiveness and international security.
CONCLUSIONS
Coming back to the picture of the Russian dolls that was suggested in introduction, the reflection
aimed at de-assembling them in order to find the smallest and unbreakable one.
The international guidelines set in the framework of the Nuclear Suppliers Group are the biggest doll
which  provides  the  basic  principles  that  drive  the  export  control  of  the  nuclear  dual-use  items:
authorisation before exporting, conditions and criteria on which the decision of the authority must be
based. However, they are not sufficient to organise the everyday trade activities because they do not
legally  constrain the (few) participating States.  Figuratively,  there is a breach on the doll,  which
allows spreading its pieces apart.  The legitimacy of the NSG for regulating the export control  is
based on the economical  realities but  is  disconnected from the diplomatic  expectations of  wide
multilateralism.  The  previous  name of  the  NSG,  the  “Club”,  is  rather  revealing,  to  this  regard.
However, even though the participating States, including all the European Union Member States, are
not legally constrained, they are politically expected to legally base their own national rules on the
application  of  these  provisions.  In  the  context  of  the  UN Security  Council  resolution  1540,  the
prospect for a “hard” implementation of these guidelines became greater since the Resolution calls
the States which have already organised their export control on sharing their best practices with
States which have not.
The  European  Regulation  428/2009  is  the  smaller  doll,  which  not  only  contains  these  basic
principles set through international coordination but also develops them and hardens them. Its scope
of application is wider than the NSG guidelines since it is generic, meaning that it rules the export
control of dual-use items, as well as the material in the case of the NSG, in general and not only the
nuclear ones. In the same way, it does not only deal with the export stricto sensu but also with other
activities prone to contribute to the proliferation of WMD in general: the brokering and the transit of
dual-use items.  Substantially,  in  making the principles more practically  useable,  and formally,  in
making them directly applicable in the EU Member States, the Regulation transforms the guidelines
from soft law to “harder law”. One may thus wonder, at this stage, if this doll is not the smallest since
it organises the export control of dual-use items for the Member States themselves. However, this
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second doll is not a regime itself since it does not provide sanctions for the infringement of the rules.
In the European law, this is the responsibility of the Member State. A third and slightly smaller doll is
expected, therefore.
The implementation of the Regulation by the EU Member States is the third and smaller doll, which
has little room for manoeuvre because the European regulation is substantially detailed. However,
this little space left  for the design of sanctions and practical  implementation of the authorisation
procedures is enough to hide the doll of which the parts cannot be separated. At this stage, the
provisions, even though they substantially originated in the European Regulation, might be called a
dual-use export control regime.
Nevertheless, it  is possible today to say that the game does not stop at this stage. The private
sector,  for  reasons  linked  to  the  needs  of  global  and  modern  businesses,  claim  for  its  own
individuality  within  the  boundaries  of  the  concrete  organisation  of  the  export  authorisation
procedures. Therefore, it may happen that we find in the near future an other doll.
One may wonder,  finally,  if  the  European doll  is  not  superfluous  while  the  non-European NSG
participants also manage to have an export control regime without this intermediary level, which
complicates the overall  legal  coherency.  Apart  from the fact  that  it  is  purely  a specificity  of  the
European States to have an intermediary level between the international and national ones in almost
all matters now, it must be said that for an area such as the export control of nuclear dual-use items,
pragmatically, it reveals itself an efficient protection. The export control regulation is a constant fight
between security and trade necessities. In setting common rules for all the 27 Member States of the
Union, the European provisions organises a sound competition within its borders and preserves a
proactive position regarding the objective of non-proliferation of WMD. For universalizing this spirit of
acceptable  conciliation  between  security  and  business  interests,  the  Union  has  a  considerable
weight thanks to its 27 Member States and it has obviously the ambition to weigh in the international
instances such as the NSG. Cohesion remains therefore the internal challenge for external success.
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